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Cable reference id: #10GENEVA239

“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

Hide header S E C R E T GENEVA 000239 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], KACT [Strategic Arms Control (ACS) Treaties], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], PREL [External Political Relations], RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands], US [United States; Aleutian Islands] SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 19, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 227 (SFO-GVA-VIII-062) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-069. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 19, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 18:10 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on February 19, chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides discussed the U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection Activities, Part Six, related to procedures for conducting Type-1 inspections. The sides reviewed the proposed text line-by-line, accepted several paragraphs and agreed to re-write others. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Homework First; U.S.-Proposed Part Six of the Annex, Continued. -------------- homework first -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner stated the U.S. delegation was expecting to receive guidance from Washington concerning a possible compromise solution regarding the conduct of Type-2 conversion or elimination inspections. Once that guidance was received, the Working Group could return to the review of Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol and finish the drafting of a Joint Draft Text (JDT) that would incorporate the changes. Ilin stated the Russian side was planning on returning to Moscow on February 27, and that it might be impossible to finish work on both Section VII and Part Six of the Annex prior to their departure. Warner recommended that the sides continue with Part Six of the Annex where the working group left off at the last meeting (Reftel). Ilin said he was ready to work on Part Six of the Annex and he understood that the Annex was important to the U.S. side. ¶6. (S) Ilin stated he had two homework items from the last meeting that he wanted to review. The first was a re-drafted paragraph proposed by the Russian side combining paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section II of Part Six of the Annex. The merged paragraph would cover movement of both road mobile launchers and submarines during the nuclear warhead portion of a Type-1 inspection. The paragraphs were similar so one paragraph would be sufficient. Ilin read the draft aloud and Warner agreed that it seemed correct. Begin text. ((3. At the discretion of the inspected Side, a designated deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs or a submarine on which designated a deployed launcher of SLBMs is located, may proceed to a specially allocated site, where the viewing of the front section of such ICBMs or SLBMs will be conducted, or where the front section will be separated from an ICBM or SLBM. The inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact, while in transit, with such deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs or with such submarine, which shall proceed to a specially allocated site, while surfaced.))2 End text. ¶7. (S) Ilin stated that the paragraph did not include mention of the SSGNs; Warner explained it was because SSGNs could be viewed at the pier without having to move them to the explosive handling wharf. Warner stated that regardless of that fact, the Second Agreed Statement on SSGNs was still in draft and the sides should assess the content of that document before deciding whether to make any mention of SSGNs in the Annex. In addition, further procedures for inspecting the SSGNs might have to wait until after the exhibition following entry-into-force of the Treaty and be worked out in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), because the United States had not determined what they might be yet. Warner stated that final agreement with Russia's combined paragraph 3 and 4 would come following the U.S. delegation's review of the official translation. ¶8. (S) Concerning his second point, Ilin stated that following a review of subparagraph 2(f) of Section II of Part Six of the Annex, the Russian side had agreed with the draft text, as presented by the United States, with the exception that Russia did not agree to permit the inspection of vehicles. (Note: Subparagraph 2(f) deals with the inspecting Party's right to inspect vehicles, containers or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher during the preparation of the front section while the launcher door is open. End note.) Ilin emphasized that inspectors had the opportunity to view, and could inspect, any containers or objects during front section preparation, and therefore, vehicles would not be subject to inspection. Warner noted the contradiction that any containers or objects leaving the area probably would be in or on a vehicle, but stated the U.S. Delegation would discuss this point further and get back to the Russian delegation. Ilin commented that vehicles were always prepositioned at the site and it did not matter what they might contain, since inspectors could observe the entire front section removal process. --------------------------------------------- - U.S.-proposed Part Six OF the Annex, continued --------------------------------------------- - ¶9. (S) Ilin explained that the Russian side would prefer to remove the statements of purpose for each individual step in the paragraphs detailing the rights granted to inspectors during the preparation of a missile front section for viewing. The purpose for each step was the same in that inspectors were ensuring that no additional front sections or RVs were present. Restating the purpose in each paragraph was redundant. The ultimate purpose of the steps was to get to the point of inspecting the warheads. Warner agreed and proposed stating the overall purpose in a paragraph at the beginning of Section II so that the purpose did not have to be repeated for each individual step. ¶10. (S) Warner continued to paragraph 6, where agreement was reached to remove one sentence which concerned a partial front section separation step relevant only to a type of missile retired during START (the SS-24). ¶11. (S) Ilin asked Warner to explain his proposal to add in subparagraph 7(c) the requirement for inspectors to view the upper missile airframe edge in the launcher following front section separation. Petrov added that during START it was nearly impossible to view the upper edge of a Minuteman III in a silo because of the payload transporter (PT) van sitting over the top of the silo. Petrov suggested that additional text could be added to require the in-country escort to provide a drawing prior to the one minute viewing to explain what the inspectors would see. This would help inspectors by giving them an idea of what they were looking for prior to viewing. Warner agreed to put the requirement in U.S. brackets and return to the subject at a later date following internal discussion within the U.S. working group and the Russian delegation's own internal discussion. Warner added that, if the Russian side would draft text to incorporate the diagram requirement, the concept could be discussed later. ¶12. (S) Ilin questioned subparagraph 10(a) concerning the right to inspect the specially allocated site (SAS) where a front section is prepared for viewing; a location that is some distance from the launcher or fixed structure where the missile designated for inspection is located. Ilin asked what the text's reference to a "portion of the site" actually meant. Warner explained that it meant an interior area or room within the SAS used for the preparation of the front section of the missile. It was agreed to change "portion of a site" to "portion of a room". Warner suggested that the term "enclosed space" could be used instead of "room." ¶13. (S) Ilin asked how inspectors could secure the SAS. Warner replied this could be done either by sealing the entrances with tamper-evident seals or positioning inspectors at each entry point to verify no re-entry vehicles were removed from the site. Ilin inquired why it was at the discretion of the inspecting Party whether to seal the doors or post observers and not at the discretion of the inspected Party. Ilin suggested it should be an agreed decision between both parties whether to seal or post observers at the SAS. Warner disagreed and stated that the decision on whether to seal or observe exits to/from the SAS is the right of the inspecting Party. Ilin bracketed the U.S. text and offered alternative Russian-proposed text that the decision to seal the SAS would be based "upon agreement of the in-country escort." ¶14. (S) Ilin raised the question why there was no time limit set for the inspection and the sealing of the SAS. Warner countered that each case was different and allowing the inspection team chief to decide the issue would be the best course of action. If the Russians had specific ideas they should present their proposal in writing. Ilin requested that the United States insert, as Russia's proposal, a time limit of ten minutes for viewing the SAS. Warner made clear that the United States had no interest in such a time limit. ¶15. (S) Ilin backtracked to paragraph 9. He suggested that where the paragraph stated that the viewing of the front section could take place within a vehicle, the vehicle should be referred to as a "special" vehicle. Warner agreed to the suggestion, acknowledging that the United States always used a special vehicle for viewing a front section. Petrov said Russia might do so too. ¶16. (S) Returning to subparagraph 10(b) concerning the SAS, Ilin inquired why there was no distance specified from which inspectors would observe the SAS during the preparation process. Warner stated that it was common practice for inspectors to remain just outside of the SAS while front section preparation was taking place. Warner asked Ilin what he suggested for a distance. Ilin said not so far that binoculars would be required; perhaps 500m. Warner countered that any distance separating inspectors from the front section measured in hundreds of meters was far too great. Ilin said setting a distance requirement was necessary in cases where the SAS was not inside a building. Warner commented that, at least in the U.S. case, a structure or vehicle was always placed over the launcher, thereby obstructing the inspectors' view. Ilin said the front section preparation of a mobile system might be outdoors, and it would not be possible to prepare the front section for viewing outside the view of the inspectors unless there was a distance requirement. ¶17. (S) Warner reminded Ilin that past Russian practice was to bring SS-25 mobile launchers into the maintenance facility, where inspectors would be placed so they could not see the preparation of the front section, but could see that nothing was brought to or removed from the area by positioning inspectors to the left and right aft portion of the launcher. Petrov asked whether the inspectors could remain outside the structure. Warner replied that if inspectors remained outside during the front section preparation, they would have to inspect the boxes on the sides of the mobile launcher upon their return, in order to ensure RVs had not been hidden in spaces on the launcher that were large enough to contain an RV. Petrov argued that the mobile launcher was not subject to inspection, and the boxes on it had other purposes. Moreover, he said silos had a great deal of extra space, but Russia did not believe RVs could be hidden in silo spaces. Warner asked the Russian side to provide their suggestion in draft text regarding the positioning of inspectors during the preparation of the front section. ¶18. (U) Documents provided: - Russia: -- Proposal for paragraph 3 of Section II of Part Six of Annex on Inspection Activities, dated February 19, 2010. ¶19. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Albertson Mr. Buttrick Maj Johnson LTC Litterini (RO) Mr. McConnell Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Col Petrov Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING