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Cable reference id: #10GENEVA233
“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

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Reference id aka Wikileaks id #251270  ? 
Subject(sfo-gva-viii): (u) Inspection Protocol Work Meeting, February 26, 2010
OriginMission Geneva (United Nations)
Cable timeSun, 28 Feb 2010 17:20 UTC
ClassificationSECRET
Sourcehttp://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10GENEVA233.html
History
Extras? Comments
VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0233/01 0591720 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O R 281720Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0647 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0395 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0465 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0469 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0465
Hide header S E C R E T GENEVA 000233 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], KACT [Strategic Arms Control (ACS) Treaties], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], PREL [External Political Relations], RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands], US [United States; Aleutian Islands] SUBJECT: (SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORK MEETING, FEBRUARY 26, 2010 CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-091. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 26, 2010 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:15 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶3. (S) At the final meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) for Negotiating Session VIII, on February 26, Dr. Warner and Col Ilin continued discussion on the U.S.-proposed draft of Section VII of Part Five to the Protocol on the issue of Type-2 conversion or elimination inspections. The Russian side continued to assert that only converted or eliminated items would be subject to inspection at Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Facilities. The U.S. side maintained that such a purpose is one part of a broader Type-2 inspection right. The sides also had an extensive discussion on the importance of notifications that would be necessary to support the inspection activity of the accumulated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs that had completed the process of elimination. End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Overall Assessment of the Session; Batching and Natural Accumulations - Continued; and Misunderstanding on Notifications. --------------------------------- OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE SESSION --------------------------------- ¶5. (S) Warner stated that the goal for the meeting should be to seek a common understanding on the approach toward conversion or elimination inspections associated with Type-2 inspections as provided for in Section VII of Part Five to the Protocol. Ilin agreed and said the most important result of the session had been the work associated with Section VII. He said that within that Section, there were more unresolved issues than resolved issues. All remaining issues were highly technical and substantive in nature. He said that if both sides remained flexible, the issues could be resolved quickly. He noted that the snow in Washington and the "Roshomon effect" (Begin comment: This reference concerns the propensity of several persons involved in a situation to remember it differently. "Roshomon" was a Japanese movie in which this effect was depicted. End comment.) from the differing interpretations of the two sides regarding results of the January Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow contributed to the delay in completing this important Section. Ilin added that he was looking forward to the upcoming break, as it would give both sides the opportunity to return with fresh ideas. Warner shared Ilin's view, especially his point regarding the "Roshomon effect" contributing to the slow start of Session VIII. --------------------------------------------- -- BATCHING AND NATURAL Accumulations - CONTINUED --------------------------------------------- -- ¶6. (S) Turning to paragraph 5 of Section VII, Warner said that the U.S. delegation had modified this paragraph by using the Russian-proposed draft as the basis for the approach that described the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs using inspections that involved both accumulated and non-accumulated lots of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers. Warner said that paragraph 6 was basically a cut-and-paste of paragraph 5 and used the same procedures for elimination inspections of eliminated mobile ICBM launchers. He said that the U.S.-proposed changes were more structural than substantive. Ilin agreed to work from the U.S.-proposed text. ¶7. (S) Warner explained that there were four subparagraphs to paragraph 5. The first subparagraph summarized the two inspection opportunities that a Party would have to confirm the results of elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs following receipt of notification regarding: (a) burned-out missile motor casings of missiles that are accumulated; and b) motor casings of missiles not associated with accumulation. While the chapeau in subparagraph 5 and subparagraph 1(a) were agreed, there was significant discussion on how to craft subparagraph 1(b) on the provision associated with inspection of eliminated missiles that would not be part of an accumulation. Ilin bracketed subparagraph 1(b) until a common understanding could be reached regarding the wording of the inspections outside the accumulation period. Both sides agreed to study this matter and bring proposals to the next session. ¶8. (S) Regarding the subparagraph associated with the details of confirming the results of elimination for missiles that have been accumulated, the following text was fully agreed: Begin text: For solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs scheduled for elimination during a calendar year, each Party shall conduct two accumulations of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs at a conversion or elimination facility in such a manner that no less than 50 percent of the total number of missiles scheduled for elimination during that calendar year would be made available for inspection of the result of elimination. Each such accumulation shall contain approximately 25 percent of the total number of solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs scheduled for elimination during that calendar year. End text. ¶9. (S) In regards to the subparagraph that sets forth the provision for confirming the results of the elimination process for missiles outside the period of inspection associated with the accumulation of missiles, while the substance of the sub paragraph was basically agreed, Ilin explained that he was uncomfortable with describing how many missiles would be in a "portion" of the remainder of the year's annual output of eliminated missiles. He suggested the sides study the current bracketed text during the break. Begin text: Type-2 inspections to confirm the results of elimination at the conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs or SLBMs will also be conducted outside the period of inspection associated with the accumulations of solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs. ((During such inspections, the inspecting Party shall have the opportunity to inspect a portion of the remainder of the annual output of eliminated missiles present at the conversion or elimination facility and subject to inspection in accordance with Part Three of this Protocol.))1 ¶10. (S) Finally, regarding the subparagraph on the provision of notification for the 30-day period of time during which inspections may be conducted, Ilin asked whether the notifications specified in the subparagraph applied to both inspection opportunities for the semi-annual accumulation of eliminated missiles, as well as to the smaller increments of eliminated missiles made available for inspection during the periods outside of the accumulations. Warner replied that the paragraph applied to both inspection opportunities. ----------------------------------- MISUNDERSTANDING ON NOTIFICATIONS --------------------------------- ¶11. (S) Following the discussion of the subparagraph on notifications, Ilin and Warner began an intensive discussion regarding the provision of notification for missiles during the batching process and the 60-day period when eliminated missiles would be displayed in the open for potential observation by National Technical Means (NTM). Warner argued that in the notification that announced the completion of the elimination process for a missile, it was essential to specify whether that missile would be part of the accumulation process. It was important that Russia provide notification of the beginning of an accumulation of missiles that had been eliminated so that the United States did not inadvertently disrupt the batching process, thereby losing the opportunity to inspect that particular accumulation or batch. Warner said the United States would be reacting to notifications provided by the inspected Party opening a 30-day inspection window regardless of whether such items were part of a planned batch, or the result of incremental output without batching. Ilin apparently failed to understand the logic of this proposal, saying that there was no need to specify whether such eliminated missiles were part of an accumulation. The sides agreed to return to this matter in the next negotiating session. ¶12. (U) Documents provided: None. ¶13. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Albertson Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick (RO) Maj Johnson Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Mr. Taylor Mr. Sobchenko (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Izrazov Ms. Vodopolova Col Zaitsev Ms. Polyntseva (Int) ¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING

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