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Cable reference id: #10GENEVA199

“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

Hide header S E C R E T GENEVA 000199 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], KACT [Strategic Arms Control (ACS) Treaties], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], PREL [External Political Relations], RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands], US [United States; Aleutian Islands] SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 17, 2010 REF: 10 GENEVA 195 (SFO-GVA-VIII-055); MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-059. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 17, 2010 Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶3. (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting co-chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin on Wednesday, February 17, the sides discussed Part Six to the Annex on Inspection Activities. Although the parties largely agreed to retain many pre-inspection restrictions (PIRs) as they were in START, the Russian side rejected any notion of recalling road mobile launchers located in non-contiguous portions of a base at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect. More importantly, the Russian side gave its first indication that it was in favor of not counting non-nuclear objects on front sections under the warhead central limits if they were located on a front section that is declared to be an ICBM equipped with nuclear-armed reentry vehicles (RVs). End summary. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Pre-Inspection Restrictions for Type-1 Inspections; Differing Problem Sets; and Non-Nuclear Objects on Front Sections. --------------------------------------------- ------ PRE-INSPECTION RESTRICTIONS FOR TYPE-1 INSPECTIONS --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶5. (S) Warner opened the discussion by initiating a line-by-line review of the U.S. proposal for Section I to Part Six to the Annex on Inspection Activities, which outlines the PIRs imposed on a particular operational base after site declaration for a Type-1 inspection has occurred. Ilin immediately voiced concern about how long PIRs lasted, and appeared confused about how these PIRs applied to the entire base while the inspection team was traveling to the base and before the designation of an item for warhead inspection, and then how the PIRs collapse to just the designated item of inspection. Ilin insisted that wording be added to the text to ensure that PIRs only applied to deployed systems during a Type-1 inspection. Warner pointed out that this was redundant, but that the United States would accept this addition because it did not change the procedures or outcomes in any way. Ilin then proceeded to clear several brackets in the U.S. proposal, but brackets around any references to "basing areas" remained. ¶6. (S) Ilin voiced concern that there should be specific references to SSGNs in each portion of Part Six of the Annex, beginning with the discussion in Section I of PIRs. While Warner reminded Ilin that these were already covered in full detail in the Second Agreed Statement, Ilin insisted it would probably be necessary to add the acronym SSGN to every passage that referred to an SSBN. Warner accepted, and said the United States would propose new language on this subject. ¶7. (S) The remainder of the discussion on the subject of PIRs for Type-1 inspections consisted of familiarizing Ilin with how such PIRs were applied on the ground during START, along with the rationale for such PIRs. Warner explained that during PIRs a heavy bomber or SSBN could move within the boundaries of the site while the inspection team was traveling to the base but once the inspection team arrived, movement of items of inspection was no longer allowed since the items must now be annotated on the site diagram and be subject to inspection at that location. ----------------------- DIFFERING PROBLEM SETS ----------------------- ¶8. (S) Considerable time was spent discussing the issue of non-contiguous areas of a designated base, and how such areas impacted the conduct of a Type-1 inspection. Warner explained to Ilin that items of inspection temporarily located between two non-contiguous portions of a site should be part of the pre-inspection briefing, as these items should be considered as candidates for inspection just as anything located within defined boundaries on a site diagram. Ilin disagreed, noting any item of inspection located between non-contiguous parts of a site should not be part of an inspection. He viewed any item in transit between two non-contiguous areas of a site as being non-inspectable, much as an SSBN at sea cannot be inspected. Warner ended this discussion by pointing out that under Ilin's construct, road mobile launchers could conceivably always be absent and therefore not inspectable. ¶9. (S) Col Petrov provided a short description of procedures for preparing a front section for a warhead inspection. Warner explained the various options employed in the past, to include viewing in a silo launcher, viewing in a vehicle, viewing near a silo launcher, and viewing in a specially allocated site. Petrov concurred that the Russians shared this conceptual vision, but requested some nuanced wording substituting "outside the launcher" for "in close proximity." Warner accepted this language as a conforming change. --------------------------------------------- -------- OBJECTS DECLARED NOT TO BE NUCLEAR ON FRONT SECTIONS --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶10. (S) Ilin requested that Warner jump ahead to paragraph 13 of Part Six to the Annex in order to allow the sides to think about a new proposal overnight. Ilin broached the subject of additional objects declared not be nuclear on the front sections of some ICBMs and SLBMs. He described three possibilities the Russians saw as combinations of objects one may find on a front section: 1) nuclear-armed RVs and objects declared not to be equipped with nuclear warheads, 2) non-nuclear-armed RVs and objects declared not to be nuclear, and 3) nuclear-armed RVs, non-nuclear-armed RVs, and other objects declared not to be nuclear. Col Zaitsev explained that the inspection team could detect what was not nuclear using radiation detection equipment (RDE), so there was a means to determine what should be "counted" and what should not be counted under the current counting rules. He stated that ballast and other objects should not be counted so long as they were on a front section that contained at least one RV with a nuclear warhead. ¶11. (S) Warner countered that all non-nuclear-armed RVs counted the same as nuclear-armed RVs under the current counting rules for START Follow-on. He asked the Russian side to clarify their intent with regard to differentiating between non-nuclear-armed RVs and other objects declared not to be nuclear. Zaitsev explained that in the instance of a front section with nuclear-armed RVs and objects declared not to be nuclear, the nuclear-armed RVs would count against the central limit, but the other objects would not. In the instance of a front section consisting of non-nuclear-armed RVs and other objects declared not to be nuclear, both the non-nuclear-armed RVs and other objects declared not to be nuclear would count against the central limit, as there was no means of differentiating between them. In the instance of a front section which contained nuclear-armed RVs, non-nuclear-armed RVs, and other objects declared not to be nuclear, only the nuclear-armed RVs would count against the central limits. Warner noted that the last scenario was complex since there was no way of determining nuclear-armed from non-nuclear-armed RVs and neither side had allowed the use of RDE on nuclear warheads under START nor were they likely to do so under START Follow-on. Warner ended the meeting by expressing interest in hearing about the Russian concept in more detail. Ilin said he would provide proposed language soon. ¶12. (U) Documents provided: - United States: -- Section I, Part Six to the Annex on Inspections, dated February 17, 2010. ¶13. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Dr. Warner Mr. Albertson Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Maj Johnson LTC Litterini (RO) Mr. McConnell Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Col Petrov Ms. Vodopolova Mr. S. Shevchenko Col Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING