Google translate
Google +1 button
Twitter button
Facebook button

Cable reference id: #10GENEVA179

“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

Hide header S E C R E T GENEVA 000179 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], KACT [Strategic Arms Control (ACS) Treaties], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], PREL [External Political Relations], RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands], US [United States; Aleutian Islands] SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: MOU WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 16, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY REF: 10 GENEVA 159 (SFO-GVA-VIII-052) CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-056. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 16, 2010 Time: 3:30 p.m. - 5:15 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva ------- SUMMARY ------- ¶3. (S) During the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group (MOUWG) meeting, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov addressed outstanding issues in Section I, General Provisions, and agreed on the title of Part Two. Trout reiterated the U.S. concept for non-deployed heavy bombers, while Orlov clarified the view of the Russian Federation. Mr. Lobner and Mr. Pischulov clarified some conceptual issues with regard to the use of UIDs on heavy bombers. Trout explained the U.S.-proposal for revising the definition for non-deployed launchers of missiles, stating that soft-site launchers would not be included and would not appear in the Database. Trout noted the need to solve the Leninsk Test Range issue. End summary. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Clearing Up the Title and Section I; Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Soft-Site Launchers; and Version Versus Variant, Again. ----------------------------------- CLEARING UP THE TITLE AND SECTION I ----------------------------------- ¶5. (S) Trout asked for Orlov's view of the discussion from that morning's meeting on Article VIII (Reftel). Orlov reiterated his view that the title of Part Two needed to be agreed upon before any progress could be made in Article VIII. Trout and Orlov agreed that the title of Part Two would be "Database for Strategic Offensive Arms," noting that the Russian translation for "database" would no longer be "initial data (iskhodnye dannye)," but rather "database (baza dannykh)." ¶6. (S) Pischulov read the new Russian-proposal for paragraph 1 of Section I, which deleted the reference to the word "database." Trout agreed with the change. ¶7. (S) Moving to paragraph 2 of Section I, Trout and Orlov agreed that the language should reflect both new Russian-proposed language as well as some original U.S.-proposed language. Both agreed to provide text the following day. ¶8. (S) Continuing to paragraph 6, Pischulov proposed some minor changes that improved readability. Trout agreed with most changes, but deferred discussion with respect to the word "locations" to the conforming group. Orlov agreed with this decision. ¶9. (S) Pischulov brought up the U.S. bracketed text in various paragraphs in Section I that contained signposts to other parts of the Treaty, Protocol, and in some cases, Annexes. Trout argued that these were valuable phrases that would aid someone who was unfamiliar with the Treaty to better understand where to go in the Treaty, Protocol or Annexes to find the requirements and obligations related to the text of that paragraph. Orlov asked Trout if it was a principled position that these signposts remain in the text. Trout stated he believed they were very useful and that they should be retained. The references remained bracketed. -------------------------- NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS -------------------------- ¶10. (S) Turning to Section II, Orlov asked if the U.S. intended to delete the bracketed phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments" after the word "non-deployed heavy bombers." Trout stated this phrase would remain until the definition of a non-deployed heavy bomber had been agreed. Orlov took the opportunity to ask for Trout's view on a definition for non-deployed heavy bomber, referencing Mr. Taylor's comments in that morning's Article VIII meeting (Reftel). LT Lobner answered that the U.S. concept was exactly what Taylor had explained, reiterating that a non-deployed heavy bomber was a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments at a certain facility. Lobner added that discussion was ongoing about what those facilities should be, but the main point was that the bomber in question was still a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments. ¶11. (S) Orlov said non-deployed heavy bombers could only be equipped for nuclear armaments, or a test heavy bomber. He asked what limits the B-1Bs converted to non-nuclear status would be subject to, referencing the deployed 700 strategic delivery vehicle limit or the deployed and non-deployed 800 launcher limit. Trout responded that they would not fall under either limit. He added that the proposed Agreed Statement on converted B-1Bs addressed these issues. Trout asked if Orlov thought the United States would count the non-nuclear B-1B heavy bombers under any of the three central limits of the Treaty. Orlov responded in the affirmative. Orlov further explained that he expected all converted B-1Bs to count under the three limits until the last B-1B was converted, at which point the B-1B would disappear from the Treaty. ¶12. (S) Lobner and Trout clarified that the Agreed Statement was clear on this matter, and that it was the U.S. position that as each B-1B was converted, it would only be counted as a "heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments" and would not be subject to any of the three central limits. ¶13. (S) Orlov made a quick presentation as to how it was impossible to prove the B-1B conversion process, referencing the unique design characteristics that go into a nuclear capable bomber. ¶14. (S) Pischulov asked if the United States would provide UIDs for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments until such time when the last B-1B was converted. Trout responded that the U.S. would provide UIDs for all heavy bombers, and consequently UIDs for B-1Bs would be provided until the last B-1B was converted. ------------------- SOFT-SITE LAUNCHERS ------------------- ¶15. (S) With regard to space launch facilities, Pischulov asked if the United States intended to declare soft-site launchers in the Database. Trout replied that the United States would not provide such information. Orlov asked why the United States had introduced the term in the Definitions Working Group. Trout said the soft-site launcher definition had to be established before it could be excluded from the definition for non-deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs. Pischulov asked if the United States was saying that soft-site launchers would not be counted as non-deployed launchers. Trout stated that this was correct. Pischulov said this was not the Russian view. ----------------------------- VERSION VERSUS VARIANT, AGAIN ----------------------------- ¶16. (S) In Section VII, ICBM and SLBM Technical Data, Pischulov asked about the only bracket in the Section which pertained to use of "variant" versus "version." Trout cited "versions" of the RS-12M launcher as an example of how "version" was used. In this case, he pointed out, two launchers existed that were different due to the location of the driver's cab. In this situation, he continued, there were two versions of the RS-12M mobile launcher. Trout posed a hypothetical question: if you modified an RS-24 launcher, what would the modified launcher be called? Orlov and Pischulov did not answer but stated the working group would have to return to the issue. ------- LENINSK ------- ¶17. (S) Trout asked if the Russian side had any proposals on how to solve the Leninsk Test Range issue. Trout reiterated statements made in several meetings over the past days, pointing out that the U.S. had no desire to prohibit or restrict Russia in this matter. The goal of the U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement was to suggest one way of solving the problem, but by no means was it the only method. ¶18. (S) Orlov recollected that the main paragraphs in the Agreed Statement were about notifications, which he had stated on numerous occasions Russia would provide. Trout noted this was a large part of the Agreed Statement, however there were additional issues in the text. Trout added that the Agreed Statement could probably be shortened and simplified. ¶19. (S) Lobner acknowledged that the United States understood Russia's point that the issue could be solved via notifications. However, he noted, if the issue was stripped down to the basic problem, Russia's solution did not work. Lobner argued the core problem was that Russia intended to locate accountable items at a non-declared facility. He further pointed out that the Notifications Protocol was designed based on the premise that movements of items would occur between declared facilities. Unless Russia proposed new language to make this work, he continued, existing notifications would not solve the problem. ¶20. (S) Orlov noted, in a personal gesture to Trout, that this was likely to be tied to the UK Trident II issue, but also quietly stated he agreed that something was wrong with the Leninsk issue. ¶21. (S) Trout stated he was disappointed that such a small "administrative" issue had expanded into such a "political" issue that was stalling the negotiations. ¶22. (S) Documents provided: None. ¶23. (U) Participants: UNITED STATES Mr. Trout Mr. Dean Dr. Fraley LT Lobner (RO) Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Gen. Orlov Mr. Pischulov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶24. (U) Gottemoeller sends. KING