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TAGS: PARM, KACT, MARR, PREL, RS, US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: MOU WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 16, 2010
-- CORRECTED COPY
REF: 10 GENEVA 159
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
(U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-056.
(U) Meeting Date: February 16, 2010
Time: 3:30 p.m. - 5:15 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
(S) During the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group
(MOUWG) meeting, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov addressed outstanding
issues in Section I, General Provisions, and agreed on the title of
Part Two. Trout reiterated the U.S. concept for non-deployed heavy
bombers, while Orlov clarified the view of the Russian Federation.
Mr. Lobner and Mr. Pischulov clarified some conceptual issues with
regard to the use of UIDs on heavy bombers. Trout explained the
U.S.-proposal for revising the definition for non-deployed
launchers of missiles, stating that soft-site launchers would not
be included and would not appear in the Database. Trout noted the
need to solve the Leninsk Test Range issue. End summary.
(S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Clearing Up the Title and Section I;
Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Soft-Site Launchers; and Version Versus
CLEARING UP THE TITLE AND SECTION I
(S) Trout asked for Orlov's view of the discussion from that
morning's meeting on Article VIII (Reftel). Orlov reiterated his
view that the title of Part Two needed to be agreed upon before any
progress could be made in Article VIII. Trout and Orlov agreed
that the title of Part Two would be "Database for Strategic
Offensive Arms," noting that the Russian translation for "database"
would no longer be "initial data (iskhodnye dannye)," but rather
"database (baza dannykh)."
(S) Pischulov read the new Russian-proposal for paragraph 1 of
Section I, which deleted the reference to the word "database."
Trout agreed with the change.
(S) Moving to paragraph 2 of Section I, Trout and Orlov agreed
that the language should reflect both new Russian-proposed language
as well as some original U.S.-proposed language. Both agreed to
provide text the following day.
(S) Continuing to paragraph 6, Pischulov proposed some minor
changes that improved readability. Trout agreed with most changes,
but deferred discussion with respect to the word "locations" to the
conforming group. Orlov agreed with this decision.
(S) Pischulov brought up the U.S. bracketed text in various
paragraphs in Section I that contained signposts to other parts of
the Treaty, Protocol, and in some cases, Annexes. Trout argued
that these were valuable phrases that would aid someone who was
unfamiliar with the Treaty to better understand where to go in the
Treaty, Protocol or Annexes to find the requirements and
obligations related to the text of that paragraph. Orlov asked
Trout if it was a principled position that these signposts remain
in the text. Trout stated he believed they were very useful and
that they should be retained. The references remained bracketed.
NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS
(S) Turning to Section II, Orlov asked if the U.S. intended to
delete the bracketed phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments" after
the word "non-deployed heavy bombers." Trout stated this phrase
would remain until the definition of a non-deployed heavy bomber
had been agreed. Orlov took the opportunity to ask for Trout's
view on a definition for non-deployed heavy bomber, referencing Mr.
Taylor's comments in that morning's Article VIII meeting (Reftel).
LT Lobner answered that the U.S. concept was exactly what Taylor
had explained, reiterating that a non-deployed heavy bomber was a
test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments
at a certain facility. Lobner added that discussion was ongoing
about what those facilities should be, but the main point was that
the bomber in question was still a heavy bomber equipped for
(S) Orlov said non-deployed heavy bombers could only be
equipped for nuclear armaments, or a test heavy bomber. He asked
what limits the B-1Bs converted to non-nuclear status would be
subject to, referencing the deployed 700 strategic delivery vehicle
limit or the deployed and non-deployed 800 launcher limit. Trout
responded that they would not fall under either limit. He added
that the proposed Agreed Statement on converted B-1Bs addressed
these issues. Trout asked if Orlov thought the United States would
count the non-nuclear B-1B heavy bombers under any of the three
central limits of the Treaty. Orlov responded in the affirmative.
Orlov further explained that he expected all converted B-1Bs to
count under the three limits until the last B-1B was converted, at
which point the B-1B would disappear from the Treaty.
(S) Lobner and Trout clarified that the Agreed Statement was
clear on this matter, and that it was the U.S. position that as
each B-1B was converted, it would only be counted as a "heavy
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments" and would not be subject
to any of the three central limits.
(S) Orlov made a quick presentation as to how it was
impossible to prove the B-1B conversion process, referencing the
unique design characteristics that go into a nuclear capable
(S) Pischulov asked if the United States would provide UIDs
for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments until such
time when the last B-1B was converted. Trout responded that the
U.S. would provide UIDs for all heavy bombers, and consequently
UIDs for B-1Bs would be provided until the last B-1B was converted.
(S) With regard to space launch facilities, Pischulov asked if
the United States intended to declare soft-site launchers in the
Database. Trout replied that the United States would not provide
such information. Orlov asked why the United States had introduced
the term in the Definitions Working Group. Trout said the
soft-site launcher definition had to be established before it could
be excluded from the definition for non-deployed launcher of ICBMs
and SLBMs. Pischulov asked if the United States was saying that
soft-site launchers would not be counted as non-deployed launchers.
Trout stated that this was correct. Pischulov said this was not
the Russian view.
VERSION VERSUS VARIANT, AGAIN
(S) In Section VII, ICBM and SLBM Technical Data, Pischulov
asked about the only bracket in the Section which pertained to use
of "variant" versus "version." Trout cited "versions" of the
RS-12M launcher as an example of how "version" was used. In this
case, he pointed out, two launchers existed that were different due
to the location of the driver's cab. In this situation, he
continued, there were two versions of the RS-12M mobile launcher.
Trout posed a hypothetical question: if you modified an RS-24
launcher, what would the modified launcher be called? Orlov and
Pischulov did not answer but stated the working group would have to
return to the issue.
(S) Trout asked if the Russian side had any proposals on how
to solve the Leninsk Test Range issue. Trout reiterated statements
made in several meetings over the past days, pointing out that the
U.S. had no desire to prohibit or restrict Russia in this matter.
The goal of the U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement was to suggest one
way of solving the problem, but by no means was it the only method.
(S) Orlov recollected that the main paragraphs in the Agreed
Statement were about notifications, which he had stated on numerous
occasions Russia would provide. Trout noted this was a large part
of the Agreed Statement, however there were additional issues in
the text. Trout added that the Agreed Statement could probably be
shortened and simplified.
(S) Lobner acknowledged that the United States understood
Russia's point that the issue could be solved via notifications.
However, he noted, if the issue was stripped down to the basic
problem, Russia's solution did not work. Lobner argued the core
problem was that Russia intended to locate accountable items at a
non-declared facility. He further pointed out that the
Notifications Protocol was designed based on the premise that
movements of items would occur between declared facilities. Unless
Russia proposed new language to make this work, he continued,
existing notifications would not solve the problem.
(S) Orlov noted, in a personal gesture to Trout, that this was
likely to be tied to the UK Trident II issue, but also quietly
stated he agreed that something was wrong with the Leninsk issue.
(S) Trout stated he was disappointed that such a small
"administrative" issue had expanded into such a "political" issue
that was stalling the negotiations.
(S) Documents provided: None.
LT Lobner (RO)
Ms. Gesse (Int)
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)
(U) Gottemoeller sends.