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Cable reference id: #09HANOI927

“All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities.” — “Refus Global“, Paul-Émile Borduas

Hide header C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000927 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/15 TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], PINR [Intelligence], ECON [Economic Conditions], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], VM [Vietnam] SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of Politburo Bad Boy To Huy Rua REF: A) HANOI 809; B) HANOI 60; C) HANOI 330; D) HANOI 672 E) HANOI 820; F) HANOI 899; G) HCMC 649; H) HANOI 537; I) HANOI 827 J) HANOI 881 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Michalak, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) ¶1. (C) Following is Post's evaluation of To Huy Rua, Chairman of the CPV Propaganda and Education Commission, whom many identify as a leading hard-line voice within the Politburo. We welcome comment from INR/B and other analysts. ¶2. (C) The Politburo's newest member, To Huy Rua, is considered by many to be a dark-horse contender for the position of General Secretary in 2011 (ref A). His selection to the Politburo at the Ninth Plenum in January (ref B) corresponded with a hardening of the Party's rhetoric, with "peaceful evolution" now augmented by references to "self-evolution" (ref C). His ascension, in our view, both reflected and reinforced a hard-line trend in evidence since the arrests of the PMU-18 journalists over one year ago (ref D). It also marked an increase in stature for the Commission on Propaganda and Education, which Rua has chaired since 2006. Rua's fingerprints were clearly on the decision to air taped confessions of Le Cong Dinh (ref E), as well as Central Committee Decree 34 (ref F). ¶3. (C) Rua is a hardliner, to be sure. Tempting as it is, though, it would be a mistake to attribute all our difficulties to Rua's plotting -- a point explicitly made by blogger Huy Duc immediately after he was fired from Saigon Tiep Thi magazine in August (ref G). Rua answers directly to CPV Standing Secretary Truong Tan Sang and through him to General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, and there is very little that Rua could do without significant backing from Sang, Manh, or Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. (Sang has, in fact, overruled decisions made by Rua, for example on media coverage of bauxite. See ref H). Some restrictive decisions, such as Decision 97, originated not from Rua but from PM Dung, who is often mistakenly identified as a political reformer (ref I). As best we can tell, the current crackdown on political dissent reflects a consensus among Politburo members and is consistent with past practice in advance of CPV Party Congresses. ¶4. (C) So, what exactly is To Huy Rua's influence and how is it brought to bear? Rua appears to have no say on economic matters. Nor has his anti-U.S. rhetoric thwarted significant advances in the mil-mil relationship, though it has found voice in prominent editorials in Quan Doi Nhan Dan. And, again, it is likely that Vietnam would be cracking down on political dissent anyway, with or without Rua. Rua's influence is probably most directly felt in increased restrictions on the press, on a heightened attention to ideology in the recruitment of cadre (though how much is lip service is hard to tell), and in literature and the arts. He is likely to rally opposition to U.S. programs such as the Peace Corps and Fulbright and to obstruct efforts to engage on governance. Rua's influence can also, we would argue, be felt in what is not happening -- in today's climate, Rua's ideological palaver has crowded out arguments for reform. In terms of factional politics, Rua is probably adding support to conservative elements affiliated with former General Secretary Le Kha Phieu, an archrival of the former reformist Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, whose followers have seen their influence steadily diminish in the year since Kiet's death. ¶5. (C) Biographical Notes: Like Le Kha Phieu, To Huy Rua hails from Thanh Hoa, though unlike Phieu, Rua probably did not begin to acquire real influence over patronage and appointments -- money -- until he entered the Central Committee in 1996 and was named Haiphong Party Secretary in 1999. Rua is a prime example of an "ideological cadre," a member of the Hanoi-centered elite who rose HANOI 00000927 002 OF 002 to prominence through academia and the Party ideological/propaganda structure, rather than through the provinces or ministries (ref J). In 1965, when he was 18, Rua joined the Youth Volunteers to Combat the Americans, a civilian organization that provided logistical support for PAVN and NLF forces, and in 1970 he began his studies in Marxist philosophy at the Central Political Propaganda and Training School, while also studying math at Hanoi University. (Details are sketchy, but it appears that Rua did not take part in the U.S. war, though he did earn a medal for "anti-U.S. struggle.") In the early 1980s, Rua completed his graduate studies at the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, earning a Ph.D. From his return to Hanoi until his appointment in Haiphong, Rua rose steadily through the academic/Party hierarchy and was named as the Deputy Director of the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy in 1996. In 2004 he became the Academy's Director. Rua joined the CPV Secretariat in 2006, the same year he took over as Chair of the Propaganda and Ideology Commission, a position he continues to hold. Michalak